All Manchester United's problems came in a short period after half-time. The gamble to play Rooney failed, Rafael was dismissed and Bayern Munich gained conviction as a result. The home side had to tell themselves they could sneak another goal at 3-1 despite being down to 10 men, yet they retreated into their shells, clicked into defensive mode and were steadily worn down.
In fairness, it is never easy to play with a man short when the opposition use the width of the field so well. Bayern stretched United expertly from flank to flank (see diagram): Robben came in-field, playing backward of square, with the ball then ferried out wide via those in the centre to Ribéry who was hugging the opposite touchline. United were forced back and, with only one front outlet, could never regain grip or momentum. One could feel the agony building as, for 40 minutes, United adopted a backs-to-the-wall mentality knowing there was always a chance they could get stung. Unfortunately that is precisely what happened.
Responding to a sending-off is every manager's dilemma. We've all faced it and, so often, the instinct is to cling on – particularly if a lead has already been established. United were 3-1 up and, at that stage, through to the semi-finals, so their adoption of a 4-4-1, conceding territorial possession, was completely understandable. I have done just that many times in the past and most teams would have done similarly.
Yet, with the considerable benefit of hindsight, could they not have taken a gamble and gone three at the back, three in midfield and three up front, or even reverted to a 4-2-3, in the hope that a decisive fourth goal could be scored? The more direct, chasing game that would have involved – by-passing midfield where they would have potentially been left weakest – is not in United's tradition. But it would have served to keep Bayern wary of the home side's power on the break.
Similarly they could have kept their shape at the back with a four, played three narrow in midfield and left two runners with energy up front to give them an alternative outlet. That seems more plausible. Nani, his confidence already high, and perhaps the substitute Giggs might have frightened Bayern a little in that scenario because having two players up front holds the focus of an opposing back four.
Instead Van Buyten was an untroubled centre-half confronted only by Nani and was able to wander forward (as in the diagram) to join in as Bayern enjoyed unrivalled possession. Badstuber, so unnerved early on, was no longer troubled by Valencia's pace with the Ecuadorean transformed from attacking instigator to midfield worker. On the opposite flank Lahm was able to come forward and support Robben, helping to create the space for the Dutchman to exploit against Evra. The former Chelsea winger's stunning volley ultimately settled the tie but it felt as if Bayern's goal had always been coming: the Germans were patient, retained the ball with ease and United were powerless to stop them.
