Donald Trump’s first letter to Xi Jinping counts, by the US president’s low standards, as a successful stab at basic diplomacy. It tepidly anticipates constructive relations with the Chinese president. Sent almost three weeks after his inauguration, it wishes the Chinese people a prosperous Year of the Rooster, which began almost a fortnight ago. The 20 or so world leaders to whom the new president has spoken have not included the man on the other side of arguably the most important bilateral relationship.
Even if the letter precedes a phone call, China’s anxiety is understandable. Mr Trump’s manifesto described it as “our enemy”. He has questioned the status quo over Taiwan, a red line for Beijing. Peter Navarro, head of his national trade council, is author of the menacingly titled book Death by China. Last year, Steve Bannon, Mr Trump’s chief strategist, said there was “no doubt” the nations would go to war over the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Secretary of state Rex Tillerson has said China should be blocked from using the artificial islands it has built there. On the other side of the scales – rather lighter at present – are defence secretary James Mattis’s observation that he saw no need for dramatic military moves and the Chinese ambassador’s reportedly “cordial” dialogue with Jared Kushner, presidential son-in-law and adviser.
It may be that Mr Trump’s team are trying to wrongfoot Beijing for negotiating purposes. China likes keeping people guessing as to its intentions; it is less keen to be on the other side. But a taskforce of China experts warned this week that the new administration’s volatility, combined with Beijing’s increasing authoritarianism and more forceful foreign policy, could prompt a dangerous confrontation. Beijing, which expressed “high appreciation” for Mr Trump’s letter, is presumably playing for time as it tries to discern the US president’s intentions and because Mr Xi has limited bandwidth for foreign policy given the economic slowdown and the complicated domestic politicking required ahead of the five-yearly party congress this autumn. A considerable number of US experts believe it should push Beijing harder on issues ranging from protectionism to its increasing domestic repression – though the latter seems unlikely to figure on Mr Trump’s agenda – and its handling of Taiwan. Some also believe China’s behaviour in the South and East China Seas must be countered quickly and decisively (easy to say, harder to do) because its military capability is developing so rapidly.
But reshaping relations would require careful planning and calibration and a still closer relationship with others in the region, notably Japan and South Korea. Instead, as a candidate, Mr Trump grumbled that they should pay more for their own defence and might need nuclear weapons to protect themselves. As president he has abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a flawed multilateral trade deal designed to counter China’s regional ascendance. He has accused Japan of currency manipulation. He has even picked a fight with Australia, something hard for a US president to do without real effort.
The Japanese prime minister Shinzō Abe, who arrives in Washington on Friday, feels obliged to come bearing gifts: the offer of hefty investment. One of Tokyo’s concerns is that the president, who seems to see the world in crudely transactional terms, could ultimately cut a deal with China by selling out America’s old allies – just as he implied that Taiwan might be merely a bargaining chip in the relationship with Beijing. Chinese scholars have sometimes warned that their country has no real allies, only convenient partners. Mr Trump seems to regard that as an ideal outcome for America as well. He is wrong. The other, possibly greater, fear is of a bilateral clash destabilising the region. Local concern about China’s growing power does not mean a desire for confrontation at all costs. Either outcome would be damaging to the US, not just Asia.
