Rex Tillerson’s plane touched down in Moscow on Tuesday amid a smoky haze caused by a fire at a nearby rubbish dump. More than one observer found the metaphor irresistible. The US approach to Syria – the term “policy” would dignify it with a coherence it does not deserve – is more opaque, contradictory and confusing than ever. Its stance on Russia, once so cosy but now confrontational in tone at least, is arguably even less clear. Its ability to work with other western nations to present a united front to Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad is similarly foggy.
The secretary of state had hoped to carry a unified and resonant message from the meeting of G7 foreign ministers in Italy. Those present in Lucca condemned the chemical attack at Khan Sheikhun that prompted last Friday’s US missile strike on a Syrian airbase, and agreed that President Assad could not be part of Syria’s future – as they have been saying for years. But they divided over what to do next and declined to back Boris Johnson’s call for further sanctions against Syrian military leaders and Russia, reflecting doubts about their efficacy and a belief that culpability for the chemical attack must be fully proven.
No one can blame other countries for seeking to keep their distance from this administration, given all we know about the man heading it and the multiple, often conflicting thoughts it has offered upon its aims and intentions in Syria. No coherent line can possibly be discerned from the remarks of Mr Tillerson, UN ambassador Nikki Haley, White House spokesman Sean Spicer and of course Donald Trump himself. As in other areas of policy, the shifting stances on this devastating six-year conflict seem to reflect a combination of ignorance, incomprehension, access and whim.
Nor can one regard the UK’s keenness to walk hand-in-hand with this administration – the result not only of the longstanding British insistence on the special relationship, but also of a certain desperation in the face of Brexit – without unease. Mr Johnson’s own inconsistencies on Syria seem in part to be caused by the attempt to remain aligned with the US leadership.
A primary concern is that, while Friday’s strike was portrayed as a one-off action warning against the use of chemical weapons, applause for Mr Trump’s decision may encourage him to take further military action, with all the attendant risks. The administration already appears to be lowering the bar for further action. And force might not be confined to Syria. Mr Trump has taken to Twitter again to warn that North Korea is “looking for trouble” and that the US will act alone if China does not help.
But evidence points overwhelmingly to Syrian government responsibility for the Khan Sheikhun attack, despite angry Russian denials. Unaccompanied expressions of revulsion do nothing to prevent such war crimes in future. The G7 meeting became a focus largely because of the impossibility of getting measures through the UN security council; in February China and Russia vetoed a motion on chemical weapons that would have introduced sanctions against Syrian military individuals and banned the sale or supply of helicopters, used to drop barrel bombs containing chlorine. Even setting aside humanitarian concerns, Syria is of direct interest to European countries given its proximity and the repercussions of its instability, including the refugee crisis. Yet the overall impression created by the meeting was of division and indecision rather than unified political will and a determination to re-engage with this terrible war.
Mr Tillerson declared that Mr Assad’s rule “is coming to an end”, without specifying how. But there has been too much optimism before that Russia could easily be persuaded to ditch the Syrian president and that the west can drive a wedge between Russia and Iran. Moscow is currently hardening its public support for the regime. Nor can Russian interests in Syria be divorced from its interests elsewhere. If Moscow can be shifted, it will take sustained, complicated diplomatic donkey work rather than posturing, as John Kerry – who put in so many hours to so little avail – could testify. It is far from clear that the administration is capable of that kind of focus and attention, even if it is seriously committed to the issue. The need for non-military responses is all the more pressing given US unpredictability. Difficult as it is, other western nations must keep seeking ways of working with the US. The same factors that make it harder to do so also make it more necessary.
