No one exactly expected the Chinese to seize a United States underwater drone in the South China Sea on Friday. But Beijing has so far proved rather more predictable than the president-elect of the US. Since Donald Trump sought to rattle its cage by sharing a phone call with Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen and questioning the “one-China” policy which has underpinned bilateral relations for decades, it has responded in ways familiar to China-watchers: careful official statements of displeasure, sabre-rattling in a populist state-owned tabloid, and a series of actions which could be coincidental but send a convenient message. Those include the first live-fire exercises by China’s aircraft carrier group, the warning that a US carmaker could face fines for monopolistic behaviour, and the scooping up of the oceanographic survey ship’s drone. It has so far moved with caution. But the risks created by Mr Trump’s behaviour are real and substantial.
In reality, Taiwan has been self-ruled since Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) fled there at the end of the civil war in 1949. But the three-cornered relationship has long been governed by polite fictions. The US acknowledges the belief that there is only one China; Taipei and Beijing have said there is only one China, but how one interprets that is a matter of deliberate ambiguity. These diplomatic acts of imagination are peculiar: Washington has security ties with the entity which it does not recognise diplomatically, to protect it from the one it does recognise. But they have smoothed Sino-US relations and stabilised cross-straits relations.
The US role has essentially been to help maintain the status quo should either side try to veer away. Under the previous KMT president, Ma Ying-jeou, cross-straits ties grew quickly, bringing economic benefits but also concern: while few on Taiwan want formal independence, many more were concerned about Beijing’s influence. China did not want the election of the Democratic Progressive party’s Tsai Ing-wen, and appears to have made itself felt in significant but deniable ways – tourist numbers are down and Taiwan was not invited to this year’s meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, despite attending previously. But it has not, for example, repudiated the agreements signed with Mr Ma. The experienced Ms Tsai has so far played a careful hand and has indicated her desire for good relations. But there is always a risk that action by Beijing and domestic political pressure might push her further.
There is a reasonable case to be made that the US should be more vocal in supporting Taiwan, a thriving democracy overseen by the only woman ever elected to top office in Asia without a political dynasty behind her, to discourage Beijing from trying to disturb the present balance. Advocates say that China’s growing military power means that challenge should come sooner not later. But that does not appear to be what Mr Trump is doing. Putting aside the possibility that he is acting on whim – this call appears to have been well-planned – there are three theses about the president-elect’s intentions. The first is that he is bringing his business tactics to diplomacy, seeing what advantages he can accrue by throwing his weight around and being unpredictable. The second is that he plans a “reverse-Nixon”, cosying up to Moscow while encouraging it to distance itself from Beijing. His advisers are hawkish towards Beijing, and the Sino-Soviet relationship has always been one of convenience rather than love, scarred by deep suspicion and repeated separations.
Taiwan could become a stick to beat China, using the sinophobia he embraced in his campaign to bolster his popularity in office. But while Beijing fosters and manipulates popular nationalism, it does not control it and must also answer to it; Taiwan is an issue on which both leaders and people feel extremely strongly. There is a profound risk of destabilising the region, and of miscalculations and missteps escalating the situation. Even if that peril is avoided, the long-term future of Taiwan matters much more to Beijing than Washington. Beijing is likely to react angrily and seek to punish the US – but will find it even easier to punish Taiwan.
That leads to the third possibility: that Mr Trump wants to use the island as leverage – as he suggested explicitly, tweeting that “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a one-China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things”. But Taiwan deserves better than to be used as a cudgel or a bargaining chip.
